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Abstract: Collision avoidance is an essential safety requirement for unmanned surface vehicles
(USVs). Normally, its practical verification is non-trivial, due to the stochastic behaviours
of both the USVs and the intruders. This paper presents the probabilistic timed automata
(PTAs) based formalism for three collision avoidance behaviours of USVs in uncertain dynamic
environments, which are associated with the crossing situation in COLREGs. Steering right,
acceleration, and deceleration are considered potential evasive manoeuvres. The state-of-the-
art prism model checker is applied to analyse the underlying models. This work provides a
framework and practical application of the probabilistic model checking for decision making in
collision avoidance for USVs.
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1. INTRODUCTION
The development of unmanned surface vehicles spans sev-
eral decades. The original radio-controlled vessels were
designed for damage assessment and dangerous mine clear-
ance operations. Over the past two decades, the develop-
ment of more advanced sensors and the increased capabil-
ities of computational power and communication technol-
ogy coupled with a reduction in cost have motivated the
use of USVs in novel applications and more complex mis-
sions such as minesweeping, environmental data collection
and monitoring, water survey, anti-surface, and submarine
warfare.
Collision avoidance (Savvaris et al. (2014)) is a central
component for the design and development of USVs, due to
that static obstacle or even dynamic intruders frequently
exist in their paths. When several USVs or other vessels
move in the same region, they act in fact as intruders
to one another themselves. Thus, research on collision
avoidance have become an active topic in the area of
autonomous vehicles, and numerous algorithms have been
proposed to realise the avoidance of static obstacles or
dynamic intruders. In the past, the dynamic environments
of USVs may be known in advance, since the intruders
are assumed to have predefined or predicted moving be-
haviours. However, today’s USVs commonly have to work
in uncertain circumstances, where the movements of the
intruders are not easy to be predicted accurately. Conse-
quently, a number of probabilistic collision avoidance algo-
rithms have been proposed in recent years, which models
both the movements of the intruders and the operations
of the vessels as probabilistic events.
The correctness of collision avoidance algorithms for USVs
is very crucial. Simulation and testing have been the
most frequently used analysis approach for verifying USVs’
behaviours. However, either of them is by no means the
best solution. Their weaknesses mainly lie in two aspects:
(1) the results are incomplete, due to that only a subset
of all the possible cases can be examined by physical
system testing or software simulations; (2) the results
are generally small sample data that are unsuitable for
complex probabilistic analysis.
Formal verification now becomes a very useful alterna-
tive approach to traditional analysis approaches such as
simulation and testing, because it is not only complete
in logic and rigorous in mathematics but also adaptable
for the description and analysis of probabilistic events.
For example, probabilistic model checking is a quantita-
tive verification approach widely applied in the reliability,
safety, and performance analysis of both hardware and
software systems. In general, there are three main phases
involved in probabilisitic model checking: (1) a high level
mathematical model is built to incorporate all the possible
probabilistic behaviours; (2) formal logical formulae are
derived to describe the key logical requirements; (3) an
automatic tool such as prism is applied to check whether
the mathematical model satisfies the logical requirements.
If all the requirements are fully satisfied, the probabilistic
behaviours are verified. Otherwise, it implies that some
errors may exist in the original model. In recent years,
formal verification has already been used to verify the path
planning problem for autonomous vehicles (Quottrup et al.
(2004); Fainekos et al. (2005)). However, there is little work
that applied in verifying the collision avoidance problem
in the same domain.
The aim of the paper is to formally verify three avoid-
ance algorithms (steering, acceleration, and deceleration)
that involve an USV and a single dynamic intruder. The
paths of the USV and intruder cross each other, and
their movements have both probabilistic and real-time
properties, which is very suitable for using probabilistic
timed automata. Thus, the probabilistic models and the
logical formulae are first built, and then the prism model
checker is applied to verify the underlying three avoidance
strategies.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section
2, we present the collision avoidance algorithms for USVs.
Section 3 introduces the necessary preliminaries of proba-
bilistic timed automata and probabilistic model checking.
Then, the PTAs are constructed in Sections 4 and 5 re-
spectively. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
2. COLLISION AVOIDANCE FOR USVS
We have made some assumptions on the motion of the
intruder vessel: (1) the whole moving process of the in-
truder can be divided into n steps; (2) the intruder has a
stepwise uniform motion, that is, it has different velocity
at different time step, and the minimum and maximum
velocities are denoted by vmin and vmax; (3) the intruder
changes the velocity at every time interval 4T ; (4) the
velocity for a time interval is constant, and independently
and randomly selected within the range of [vmin, vmax].
Based on the work of Miura and Shirai (2000), the prob-
ability distribution p(x;n) for the intruder to reach the
position x after n steps can be expressed as:
p(x;n) =
1√
2piσ2i
e
−( (x−x¯i)2
2σ2
i
)γ
, t ≥ 0, γ, α > 0 (1)
where σ2 = σ20 + nσ
2
step, x¯i = x0 + nv¯4T , and σ2step =
(vmax − vmin)2/12. Here, x0, σ, and v¯ are the initial po-
sition, variance, average velocity, respectively. Integrating
p(x;n) along the practical path of the intruder, one can
obtain the probability of reaching the position x.
In this paper, three collision avoidance algorithms are
given for a USV with only a single dynamic intruder. As
shown in Fig. 1, the former and the latter are represented
by a black-yellow USV and a white-blue ship, respectively.
Assume that the paths of the USV and the intruder
intersect at region C with angle θ (0◦ < θ < 180◦) (see
Fig. 1). I2 and U2 represent their positions when they
begin to enter the collision region C, while I3 and U4 stand
for those when they just leave such a region completely. U0
is a reference position of the USV, which can be specified at
an arbitrary point not over U2. I0 and I1 are two reference
positions of the intruder. U1 is an undetermined position
of the USV.
Under this condition, we mainly consider three avoidance
behaviours: acceleration, deceleration, and steering. For
the acceleration behaviour, the USV goes across region
C earlier than the obstacle does by increasing its velocity;
for the deceleration case, it passes region C later than the
obstacle does by decreasing its velocity; for the steering
one, it realises collision avoidance by changing its moving
direction as shown in Fig. 2, where α is the heading angle
and γ is the turning radius. When α and γ are given,
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Fig. 1. The paths of an USV and an intruder: the USV is
the stand-on vessel with respect to the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972
(COLREGS).
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Fig. 2. The steering behaviour of the USV: the USV is the
stand-on vessel with respect to the COLREGS.
according to its probabilistic behaviours, the USV may
choose either U0 U4 or U0 U5. We represent U0 U4 as the
expected path, while U0 U4 as the unexpected path. In Fig.
2, U4 represents the position where the obstacle begins to
enter the path intersection region in the expected steering
behaviour.
3. PROBABILISTIC MODEL CHECKING
3.1 Probabilistic Timed Automata
Full details about probabilistic timed automata (PTAs)
can be found (Kwiatkowska et al. (2006); Norman et al.
(2013)). We outline the important aspects in this section.
PTAs allow us to use the real-valued clocks of timed
automata, together with the discrete probabilistic choice
of MDPs. PTAs have real-valued clocks and, like MDPs
and therefore allow us to model systems with a range
of different characteristics (non-determinism, probability,
and real time).
Fig. 3. An example of a probabilistic timed automaton,
with clock x and integer variable tries, modelling
attempted message transmission over an unreliable
channel.
In this section, we illustrate a number of basic PTA con-
cepts using the example in Fig. 3. The Figure illustrates
a probabilistic timed automaton, with clock t and integer
variable try, modelling a simple probabilistic communi-
cation protocol. In the protocol, a sender repeatedly at-
tempts to transmit a message over an unreliable channel.
The probability that the sender’s transmission fails due
to that the channel is unreliable is 0.05, and the sender
successfully transmit the message to the receiver with
probability 0.95. If message data from the sender is lost,
the sender suspends its activity, and there is a delay (of
between 4 and 6 time units) before the sender tries to
resend its message (up to M − 1 times).
The control states of the automaton model, “state = 0”,
“state = 1”, “state = 2”, “state = 3”, have the meaning of
“transmit”, “wait”, “quit”, and “finish”respectively. They
are depicted as the nodes (circles) of the underlying graph,
and the available transmissions between these control
states are indicated as the edges (with arrow) of the graph.
In the initial state, “state = 0”, shown as the extra border,
a communication is being initialised by the sender along
the transmission channel. After between 2 and 3 time
units, the sender attempts to send the message, and with
probability 0.95 message is sent correctly, meantime with
probability 0.05 message is lost. In “s = 1”, when 4 to 6
time units have elapsed from whenever the message is lost,
the sender tries to re-transmit the message.
Definition 1. A probabilistic timed automaton PTA is a
tuple of the form
(L, l0,Σ, inv, prob) where:
• L = {l0, l1, l2, ..., ln} is a finite set of positions;
• l0 ∈ L is the initial position;
• χ = {x, y, z, ...} is a finite set of clocks;
• Σ = {a, b, c, ...} is a finite set of events, of which
Σu ⊆ Σ are declared as being urgent;
• the function inv : L → CC(χ) is the invariant
condition;
• the finite set prob ⊆ L × CC(χ) × Σ ×Dist(2χ × L)
is the probabilistic edge relation.
Note that clocks are real-valued. The values of the clocks
synchronise and increase together over time. Transitions
and states may have guards and invariants over clock vari-
ables and other variables which indicate when transitions
can occur and how long can be spent in a state. In our
example, the transition between states state = 0 and
state = 1 (or state = 2) has the clock guard t ≥ 2. The
state state = 0 and state = 3 have the invariant t < 3 and
t < 6 respectively.
The semantics of PTAs are formally defined as an infinite
state MDP. As clocks are real-valued the MDP will have
an infinite state-space (both in terms of set of states, and
the set of transitions). Since model-checking algorithms
are designed to work on finite state spaces, the analysis
of PTAs requires some form of abstraction, to a finite
state representation. PTAs have been used to verify a
variety of protocols, e.g. the CSMA/CD back-off protocol
(Duflot et al. (2005)), the FireWire root contention pro-
tocol (Kwiatkowska et al. (2003)), and the IPv4 Zeroconf
protocol (Kwiatkowska et al. (2006)).
3.2 The Probabilistic Model Checker prism
In this paper, we use Continuous Stochastic Logic (CSL)
(Baier et al. (1999); Aziz et al. (2000)) to specify require-
ments as properties. There are two types of formulae in
CSL: state formulae, which are true or false in a specific
state, and path formulae, which are true or false along a
specific path.
Definition 2. Let a ∈ AP be an atomic proposition, p ∈
[0, 1] be a real number, ./ ∈ {≤, <,>,≥} be a comparison
operator, and I ⊆ R≥0 be a non-empty interval. The
syntax of CSL formulas over the set of atomic propositions
AP is defined inductively as follows:
• true is a state-formula.
• Each a ∈ AP is a state formula.
• If Φ and Ψ are state formulas, then so are ¬Φ and
Φ ∧Ψ.
• If Φ is state formula, then so is S./p(Φ).
• If ϕ is a path formula, then P./p(ϕ).
• If Φ and Ψ are state formulas, then XIΦ and ΦUIΨ
are path formulas.
In this paper, we use the prism probabilistic model checker
developed by the work of Kwiatkowska et al. (2009). It sup-
ports the analysis of several types of probabilistic models:
discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), continuous-time
Markov chains (CTMCs) (Peng et al. (2014)), Markov
decision processes (MDPs) (Lu et al. (2015)), probabilistic
automata (PAs), and also probabilistic timed automata
(PTAs), with optional extensions of costs and rewards.
Moreover, prism allows us to verify properties specified
in the temporal logics PCTL for DTMCs and MDPs and
CSL for CTMCs. Models are described using the prism
language, a simple, state-based language.
4. FORMAL MODELLING OF USVS WITH
RESPECT TO A STATIC OBSTACLE
In this section, we present an illustrative case study of
a single USV with respect to a static obstacle, analysed
using PTAs and probabilistic model checking.
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Fig. 4. Fuel consumption in different area.
We use a case study to illustrate the role of PTAs for the
analysis of USV if there is a static obstacle. In this case,
the area is divided into 12 positions, from 0 to 10 (as shown
in Figure 4. One of the areas is shaded, which denotes the
position of a static obstacle expressing this position cannot
be passed by the USV.
Assuming a USV starts to travel from position 0 to
position 10, during this process, the USV operators need
to evaluate the condition and environment of the positions,
and decide the optimal path to the position 10. Because of
the uncertainty of the navigation, guidance, and control,
the USV does not always move to the intended direction.
There is a probability of 20% that the USV will move
to the wrong direction or remain in the same position.
Furthermore, there is a probability of 10% of the deviation
to the left position and similarly to the right position.
When the USV does not move according to the planned
path, it will have to re-select the path of the route. For
example, when the USV should move ahead to position 4
from position 0, it has 80% probability of completing the
mission, 10% probability of remaining in position 0, and
10% probability of moving to position 1.
In this case, there are two other parameters: path following
time and path following fuel cost. The time the USV
spends in each position moving to each direction varies.
The energy the USV uses in each position also varies.
Figure 4 shows the fuel cost in each position. Table 1 shows
the time spent by the USV to move between positions.
4.1 Real-time verification
Model checking using prism shows that the probability of
the USV completing the path within 30 minutes is 0.84134.
The USV will have 5.184% moving to the area 10 within
15 minutes, and 84.134% within 30 minutes. Figure 7
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Fig. 5. Probabilistic timed automaton (PTA) w.r.t. mini-
mum fuel consumption.
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Fig. 7. The probability curve w.r.t. travel time of the USV.
Table 1. Time consumption of the USV moves to each position.
Direction 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
East 3 ∼ 5 5 ∼ 6 7 ∼ 8 3 ∼ 5 6 ∼ 7 − − 7 ∼ 8 5 ∼ 5 2 ∼ 6
South − − − − 4 ∼ 7 6 ∼ 8 3 ∼ 5 5 ∼ 8 4 ∼ 8 −
West − 4 ∼ 6 7 ∼ 8 − − 5 ∼ 8 − − 4 ∼ 5 4 ∼ 6
North 2 ∼ 5 3 ∼ 6 − 4 ∼ 5 5 ∼ 7 6 ∼ 8 4 ∼ 5 − − −
illustrates the relationship between the probability and
time to complete the whole path.
We models a simple single USV scheduling in case of
the Wenchuan earthquake. The USV starts in the initial
position 0; after between 3 and 5 time units, the USV
attempts to move to position 4:
• with a probability of 0.8, the USV starts to move to
position 4;
• with a probability of 0.1, the USV stays in position
0;
• with a probability of 0.1, the USV starts to move to
the position 1 instead.
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Fig. 8. Result of the USV to reach a given target: minimum
energy consumption.
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Fig. 9. Result of the USV to reach a given target: minimum
time.
The minimum energy consumption requirement of the
USV moving from position 0 to position 10 is 13.3. The
route of the USV is as shown in Figure 8 for minimum
energy consumption. The best route is: 0→ 1→ 5→ 8→
9→ 10. If the direction of USV deviates, the USV should
take the best route of each area as shown in Figure 8, for
which the energy consumption is the least.
Similarly, the time the USV spends transferring from
position 0 to position 10 is at least 22.8 minutes. The
shortest path is shown in Figure 9. The best route is:
0 → 4 → 7 → 8 → 9 → 10. There is one best direction
from each area. Once the USV enters into an area, the
USV will take the least time if the USV takes the given
path.
5. FORMAL MODELLING OF USVS WITH
RESPECT TO A DYNAMIC OBSTACLE
In this section, we give the probabilistic timed automata
(PTAs) models for both the obstacle and the USV with
respect of three collision avoidance behaviours.
5.1 PTA Model of the Dynamic Obstacle
Assume that the dynamic obstacle moves along its path
from the initial position OS to the terminal position OE .
During the process of movement, it passes the positions
O0, O1, O3, O2, and O4 in turn. Under this condition,
its movement is divided into seven states, and then its
model can be constructed as shown in Fig. 10. According
to the collision avoidance behaviours, we consider O0 O3
is the dangerous region. As a result, if the obstacle is in
the state i01 or i13, the USV should make decision on a
specific behaviour to avoid collision.
Fig. 10. The PTA model of the intruder.
5.2 The PTA model of the USV
In this subsection, we provide the formal representation for
the state transitions of the USV (see Fig. 11, Fig. 12, and
Fig. 13). In the description, we assume that each collision
avoidance behaviour can be performed by the USV with a
certain probability.
Fig. 11. The PTA model of the steering behaviour.
Fig. 12. The PTA model of the acceleration behaviour.
Fig. 13. PTA model of the deceleration behaviour.
6. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have successfully used a case study
to demonstrate how to use probabilistic model checking
technique for verifying three collision avoidance behaviours
of a USV in an uncertain dynamic environment. We first
build a probabilistic timed automata based models of
the underlying behaviours. Then, we apply the prism
model checker to analyse the PTA models. We believe that
this work can provide a foundation for the verification of
complicated decision makings behaviours such as collision
avoidance for USVs.
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